NYCTA KINGS HIGHWAY Tower Closes

 While I was hoping that the massive COVID related hit to transit would freeze infrastructure "improvements", many transit agencies seem to have kept the faith in Federal funding and use the reduced service plans to accelerate certain infrastructure improvements.  The F route to Church Ave was re-signaled in 2013, closing Model 14 equipped towers at 4TH AVE and CHURCH AVE, which I noted at the time.  This left KINGS HIGHWAY and CULVER YARD as the last remaining towers on the route, with KINGS HIGHWAY having the distinction as being the last elevated main line tower with a traditional interlocking machine, a 44 lever GRS Model 5 (Note the Flushing Line's 111TH ST master tower is also located in a traditional elevated structure). 

Unfortunately due to COVID and obliviousness, I did not get a chance to get out to KINGS HWY before it closed, however well known NYCTA videographer DJ Hammers did a special video on the tower and the re-signaling project, including some interior photos. 

For the lay person, unless the tower is demolished it will look pretty much the same along with the interlocking hardware.  This is in contrast to the underground towers which are frequently cleaned out and plated over. I'm looking for stuff to do this year and getting out to Kings Highway on the F has moved up on the list.

BNSF Moves to Abandon Chicago Cab Signaling

Following in the footsteps of Union Pacific, BNSF has petitioned the FRA to abandon its cab signaling system on the former CB&Q Chicago "Racetrack" Sub between Chicago and Aroura, IL.  In service only for METRA commuter trains, the system dates from the heyday of first generation safety systems following an ICC order in the 1920's.  With PTC being the cited reason, it is now up to the FRA to decide if new technology is an acceptable replacement for the simpler, yet far more resilient safety systems from the 20th century.  Although the burden ostensibly falls on METRA, which contracts BNSF to run the commuter rail service, BNSF is still responsible for maintaining the physical plant.  If the CB&Q cab signals are discontinued, it will be harder to justify METRA's Rock Island district 20 mile segment of cab signals between Blue Island and Joliet.

All of this represents a stunning reversal of fortune for cab signaling in North America as the system has seen robust expansion over the first part of the PTC era as northeastern railroads relied on it to meet the mandate. While Class 1 road NS has also been recently expanding its cab signal territory, CSX has applied to discontinue use of the CSS based ATC system on the RF&P Sub in Virginia.  The latter is less problematic as the ATC only enforced a minimum brake pipe reduction upon cab signal downgrade as is made completely redundant by PTC protections.  CSX has states no intention of removing the cab signals, partly due to the pending takeover of the corridor by the State of Virginia for increased passenger operations.  It remains to be seen if the future 110mph S-Line restoration will feature cab signals or rely solely on PTC.

Bell Tolls for Caltrain's 1907 Signal Bridge

 Way back in 2004 when the San Francisco peninsular commuter rail service known as Caltrain was being modernized with new trains, new passing tracks and new signaling, only a few pieces of Southern Pacific era hardware was retained.  Perhaps the most spectacular of these was the 8 track signal bridge just north of the South San Francisco Station sources claim dates from 1907.

Needed to span a number of freight sidings, the signal bridge was evidently found to be in reasonable condition and subsequently fitted with two pairs of modern signals.  Unfortunately, 15 years later freight service on the peninsula has continued to shrink and a new electrification project has provided capitol money to re-build the South San Francisco holdout platfom and replace the century old lattice steel signal bridge with a modern cantilever. 

While the Bay Area's preservation mindset makes its likely that the signal bridge will avoid being sent to a scrap yard, the electrification project also makes it likely that the signal bridge will need to be moved elsewhere, perhaps to an existing museum, a Caltrain parking lot as an art installation or maybe just the purgatory of the former SP Bayshore shop and yard complex while the powers that be figure out what to do. 

Union Pacific Looking to Can Automatic Cab Signals?

 In November 2017, I learned of a builtin order showing that Union Pacific was shutting down the Automatic Cab Signals (ACS) and ITCS that had been installed on the Lincoln Corridor as part of the multi-billion dollar 110mph upgrade.  (You can see how they operate in this 2012(!) video). 

Although it seemed to be part of the general ETMS PTC rollout and the elimination of the more unique ITCS PTC system I was puzzled that operation of ACS and PTC were to be exclusive, the former only to be cut in if the latter failed. 

13.1.4 PTC/ACS Operations:

The Automatic Cab Signal (ACS) system on the lead unit must be cut out
upon successful initialization of the Positive Train Control (PTC) system and
prior to initiating movement. If the PTC system disengages, is cut out under
authority of the train dispatcher, or otherwise fails en-route while leading
engine is within PTC/ACS territory, the train must be stopped. After stopping,
the ACS system on the lead unit must be cut in prior to any subsequent
movement. If the ACS departure test cannot be performed while on energized
track, a departure test must be conducted in accordance with Rule 13.1.5 at
the train's next forward location where such a test can be performed. If unable
to cut in ACS system on the lead unit, the train must comply with Rule 13.3.3.

Of course this flies in the face of NS's integration of cab signals and PTC, which allowed them to reduce the reliance on a real time digital radio link.I was about to do a post on this situation and how ETMS and ACSES/CSS may be incompatible, but further research indicated that such incompatibility did not exist and I left the post in draft form. 

Well a comment to my previous post on the elimination of IIATS on UP's METRA commuter lines in Chicago indicated that the Joliet Sub rule regarding ACS and PTC had become a System Special Instruction also covering ATS and CNW ATC.

Item 10-B Positive Train Control (PTC) Operations

8. PTC, ACS, ATC and ATS Operations

PTC must be the system utilized by the engineer. Upon successful initialization of PTC all subsequent systems (ACS, ATC, and ATS) must be Cut Out. If at any time PTC disengages, is Cut Out under the Train Dispatcher's authority or otherwise fails, the train must be stopped and the secondary system cut back in prior to any further movement.

This covers a HUGE amount of cab signaled territory stretching from Chicago through Iowa (CNW ATC), Iowa through Wyoming and the Portland Sub in the Columbia River valley.  While the elimination of the clunky 2-aspect CNW ATC system was expected due to its uniqueness, ACS is a standard, 4 aspect, pulse code cab signal system generally compatible with what is used by NS, CSX and the Northeast passenger roads.  As I said before, NS has actually expanded its CSS territory in response to PTC as it solves many problems with radio coverage.  It is also used by Demver's new RTD commuter rail to support a reduced aspect signaling system.

As I pointed out with my NS example, the motivation behind this move is puzzling.  UP went as far as to get FRA permission to operate ACS and PTC trains in mixed company, so there is no technical safety or technical reason that these systems cannot get along.  (BTW, the document is a great primer on how both ACS and PTC are displayed in cab).  In addition to solving much of the issue with a reliable and secure radio path, the FRA PTC regulations also give additional leeway to trains operating after a PTC failure where ATC (as could be enabled by ACS) is still working. 

In theory it could mean an additional test or form, if such a test was not rolled into the existing PTC test.  The ACS antennas behind the pilot are also a potential source of damage that can take a locomotive out of service. I asked around on some forums and the desire to allow foreign leaders on run-through freight was also brought up.  There are also two significant technical issues that may be playing a role.  

The first is that ACS does not map to wayside aspects in the same way PRR/CR/NS CSS due to the lack of strong speed signaling.  For example, Approach Diverging triggers Approach in the Cab while Diverging Clear, Approach Clear 50 and Approach Clear 60 all trigger Clear in the cab.  This cannot really be used to inform a speed based ATC function.  Furthermore, UP never installed cab signal cut points in advance of wayside locations, so the cab signal never drops to Restricting in advance of a Stop or Restricted Proceed signal.  All of this might require intermediate PTC data links to be maintained, or at the very least require specialty programming to deal with the difference between CSS and ACS practice.

On the other hand ACS has at least two advantages that PTC lacks and both are rooted in using the rails to deliver the cab signal codes.  The first is that a train in a Restricted block can take advantage of a ACS upgrade after running its own length (granted not a huge deal with monster freight trains) and the second is that PTC is blind to any sudden circuit shunt in an already occupied block, whereas ACS will immediately fail safe.  The second is likely to result in deadly accidents on an infrequent yet regular basis.

Hiawatha Sub Aspect Change Point near Baileyville, KS

Perhaps the ultimate answer to this question will be what happens on the Hiawatha Sub in Kansas, where UP installed its version of Rule 562 (Cab Signals Without Wayside Signals) on about 60 miles on single track main line.  Google shows PTC antennas in place at what they term Aspect Change Points, which are spaced at twice the frequency of normal wayside signal locations, clearly to ensure that any occupied block has 1.5 miles of Restricting indication behind it. If ACS are retained on this line, it would show that PTC and ACS can function together and that UP (or the FRA) still wants some kind of signal indication to be presented to the crew.  If the System rules apply on the Hiawatha Sub, then we will are likely seeing the first instance of a rail line signaled solely through the PTC system, something railroads have notably gone out of their way to avoid. 

As of 2019 UP had already applied to abandon the ACS so only time will tell if the FRA will grant this and the other requests that will follow.  At this point safety panic might be working in favor of the concept of a secure, reliable in track signaling system that has a lot of what is necessary to allow for 90+ mph operation without costly and time consuming certification processes.  It might be worthwhile in trying to engage in the regulatory process to prevent such a short sighted move.