METRA Confronts Sticky Speeds

METRA recently announced that they were looking to raise speeds on its electric division from the current 65mph to 80 or even 90mph. Typically this is the sort of project that justified a 8 or 9 figure capital spend with concrete ties and brand new signaling. However this announcement explained that management simply looked at the facts on the ground and concluded there wasn't actually anything precluding those faster speeds. Apparently the entire operational management of METRA has assumed that the 65mph figure was a fundamental limitation of the current ABS/CTC block signaling distances that were laid out with the electrification programme in 1926. In reality those speeds and signaling distances were tied to the braking profiles of  Pullman-built heavy weight MU cars that were built for the "new" electrified service at the same time. Management had simply neglected to update its prior assumptions both time the IC/Metra Electric fleet was renewed.

To be fair to Metra, in 1972 a "stopping distance" related crash between heavyweight and Highliner stock killed 45 people probably made Illinois Central management less enthusiastic about making the line faster, especially when 1926 Pullman stock was still in South Shore Li8ne service. In 1983 when the last of the old cars were finally retired the IC Electric division was run under contract to the Chicago Regional Transportation District (later branded as Metra) with with Metra formally purchasing the line in 1987. The accident plus the delayed retirement of older equipment and topped by the contract operation and then change in ownership goes a long way to explain why the electric district speeds stayed unchanged through two equipment replacement cycles, however the problem of sticky speeds isn't unique to Metra and bedevils rail operations across the United States.

Back in the day railroad operating speeds were a somewhat nebulous concept. The number one limiting factor on how fast trains went was fast they could go. Often the timetables would only list restrictions with everything else left to the skill of the engineer because, except for a few crack passenger locomotive classes, in the age of steam trains just didn't go that fast (and the fastest trains had the most experienced crews). It was the 1948 ICC rule requiring ATS for speeds 80mph and higher that was the harbinger for the formalization of railroad speed limits that took place in the 1970's and 80's. Objective regulated standards replaced the judgement of railroad superintendents in areas of track geometry, signaling and, most recently, grade crossing warning time. Railroads tended to get a bit of pass on what was already in the rulebook or in service so they were ok as long as they didn't try to make anything faster. 

This is now we have things like the old RF&P being a 70mph railroad while the adjacent "A-Line" is an 80mph railroad despite both being run by CSX to approximately the same standards. Raising those speeds require expensive consultants to dot all the i's and maintainer hours to adjust all the grade crossing equipment, all to say a few minutes for trains the freight owner doesn't run. Passenger operators like METRA are also not immune as the inevitable grade crossing or trespasser strike will have lawyers pouring over any recent decision to raise speeds. Long story short management will see little benefit from raising speed, but assume a great deal of professional and institutional risk. The exception lies in cases where significant amounts of money are available to rebuild a line to make the speed increase effectively free. 

Fortunately as we have seen with the NYC Subway and now with METRA's electric division, transit management seems more willing to take on the risk to improve performance. SEPTA in particular is notorious for its 1930's vintage speeds set to match the performance of heavyweight AC MU cars.