Death by 1000 Cuts: The NYCT Subway Slowdown

 Starting in the 1990's, the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) started a process to slow down the largest subway system in North America, ostensibly in the name of safety. Over the next two decades the process, conducted slowly and out of public view, went from costing riders a few minutes here and there to triggering a full on capacity meltdown as the system, despite its decreased performance, benefited from record ridership. Transit Twitter and Blog personality Uday Schultz has recently completed an exhaustive history of the great slowdown and the science of transit speed control in general. It's a great read and starts with a zero based explanation of the NTCYA's trip-stop and timer based ABS signaling system up through the events that triggered the management action and the subsequent slide into dysfunction. Still, while this piece does a great job explaining why, it comes up a bit short explaining "why". So lets dive in a bit.

One shot GT timer signals added to CANAL ST interlocking before re-signaling.

In the early 2000's everyone in the NYC Subway fan community was aware of the performance decreases and would track how the NYCTA seemed to seek out any location where trains could get moving and just find ways to throttle service back to a plod. Even in locations with no infrastructural changes the trains were operated with an appreciable lack of urgency. The community was full of theories as to why this slowdown was happening and, to a lesser degree, why nobody seemed to care. After all other cities, even those with traditional signaling systems like Philly, Chicago and Boston, found ways to achieve brisk acceleration and top speeds of 55-70mph, making the 25mph crawl of the NYC Subway a distinct outlier. 

SEPTA Broad Street Subway Express train @58mph.

As Uday's article covers (read it now to avoid spoilers), the speculation the early 2000's fan community was both right and wrong at the same time. They were right in that most of their theories were correct.  They were wrong in that there was no one reason that bore primary responsibility for the problem. The newer equipment, up through R68, did have slightly better performance than those the signal system was designed for. The new composite brake shoes did have slightly worse performance than the old iron shoes. The system did rely on train operator rules compliance and related management thereof to ensure safety. Then, between 1991 and 1995 all of these factors combined in varying degrees to cause four significant accidents, opening the NYCTA up to both liability and public pressure.

Inbound Williamsburg Bridge ramp with carlength long grade timer blocks.

The response was similarly multi-pronged from slowing rolling stock down in both acceleration and top speed (55 to 40mph), ubiquitous use of intermittent speed control devices, curtailment of restricted speed operation and harsh punishments for trip stop engagement. Much of this action plan was implemented over a period of 20 years so casual riders didn't really notice the decline in performance. The cherry on top was that the intermittent speed control devices were then allowed to drop below posted thresholds making operators wary of even trying to follow the posted speeds. This is what caused the opportunity to get a skilled operator and a "good run" to vanish over the course of the 2000's, especially as the pre-90's workforce that learned to run trains without speedometers, gradually retired. 

All of this background leads to the real question, why did ostensibly high level management decide that such a drastic decrease in performance was acceptable? This is important because in an age when getting the public to *want* to choose public over private transport, the performance of public transport is increasingly throttled by policy leaving private transport as the only option that can attempt to offer speed and convenience. Well, lets put on our 1991 hats and see what management may have been thinking.

1. The most salient factor was the long term plan to equip the NYC Subway with a full time ATC/ATO system, later realized with the selection of CBTC to replace the wayside signals, timers and trip stops. Investment in an end-of-life signal system would be wasteful and performance decreases could be argued as temporary.
   
   
2. After peaking at 2 billion annual riders in 1948, the shift to non-urban living and private transport dropped ridership by over half with the peak of NYC's crime wave coinciding with the subways trough of ridership. The system was running at half capacity so "slightly" increasing trip times was likely not seen to be a big deal.
   
   
3. Decades of disinvestment had caused the NYC Subway to fall into a prolonged state of bad repair. With limited funds compelled trading performance for safety.
   
   
4. The threat of continued accidents was a political liability while small overall changes in performance would be unlikely to generate much if any notice let alone political pushback.
   
   
5. The reliance on operator skill presented not only the continued risk of accident, but would also put up pressure on costs as said skilled workers had to be trained and retained. Uniform operations according to the speed control systems would make operators fungible and require a lower skill floor.
   

These 5 factors could be arranged multiple ways to create a compelling policy proposal to management. It would have taken an extraordinary amount of personal risk for any of the top officials to insist on maintaining performance standards when CBTC was right around the corner anyway. I think the decisive element was the NYC Subway consistently running at half capacity for over two decades. It's not even that signal system capacity *could* be reduced with little impact, but that the 900 million annual ridership seemed to be both a floor and generally baked into the city. If local New Yorkers were willing to risk their life to ride the system, an extra few minutes wasn't likely to deter them either. To some extent management was proven correct, their slowness campaign only became a problem after ridership doubled over the following 20 years.

If you want a take away its that reducing performance has, is and will be the go-to fix for even rare safety problems. We've seen this with PTC and we've seen this on other transit systems like SEPTA and WMATA. The changes are rarely publicized and the public rarely objects even as they unconsciously sour on rail transit and make the switch to private vehicles. After the service meltdown NYCTA did set up a speed improvement task force that has been fixing the mis-calibrated timers and raising speeds that were subjected to overly conservative calculations. Still, while the rollout of CBTC has allowed for increased performance profiles, it would be interesting to calculate if they match what was achievable by human operators working under a system with a slightly greater tolerance for risk.

PS: An interesting comparison can be had with how the UK responded to the Ladbrook Grove Rail Crash of 1999. The crash program to install TPWS at select locations was similar to NYCT's system-wide modifications, however as far as I can tell, it had minimal impact on train operation, perhaps in part of the UK's continued reliance of train drivers' compliance with rules to ensure safety, as opposed to technical mechanisms.

NYCTA CBTC Plan to Prioritize Closing Main Line IND Towers

 I just wanted to share a little info graphic put out by the NYC Transit Authority about its upcoming re-signaling plans.  In summary, due to ridership decreases due to COVID, the TA is no longer going to focus on CBTC as a capacity expansion tool, but as a cost reduction tool and will therefore be targeting its remaining un-resignaled lines on the IND, specifically the 8th Ave (A)(C)(E), 6th Ave (F), Fulton and Crosstown (G). These segments have pretty much all of the remaining single interlocking towers with either GRS Model 5 or US&S Model 14 interlocking machines.

Now, my tower list is from 2019 and I haven't been closely tracking NYCTA tower closures, but at risk interlocking machines include Model 5's at 30TH ST, 42ND ST NORTH and 42ND ST SOUTH on the 8th Ave Line, UTICA AVE, BROADWAY JCT, LAFAYETTE AVE and HOYT on the Fulton Line, YORK ST on the Houston Essex Line and NASSAU AVE on the Crosstown Line, as well as Model 14 machines at JAY ST on the Prospect Park Line and BEDFORD-NOSTRAND on the Crosstown line. Likely also affected would be the NYCTA's first GRS NX machine at EUCLID ave, but likely not affected are yard towers or the COURT ST transit museum tower. The Model 14 at PARSONS on the (F) is of currently unknown status as that section is currently undergoing re-signaling right now.

If you are looking to get a glimpse of some living NYCTA interlocking machines, the Model 5's on he Fulton Line are visible from the ends of the platform with UTICA AVE and LAFAYETTE AVE on the outbound platform and BROADWAY JCT on the inbound platform. 

I am currently planning an NYC trip for Mid-October and will attempt to check in on these locations.

FTA 2013 CBTC Case Study, With Takeaways!

It's time for another government document hiding in plain sight! This time we have CBTC case study from 2013 that covers the NYCTA 2003 L line project and SEPTA's 2005 Subway-Surface trolley tunnel project. You may recall my often cited MBTA study that determined that CBTC was not cost effective compared to coded track circuit cab signals. This document's primary goal is to explore the derails of each project and determine what lessons can be learned, however it does reach the conclusion that both projects reached their goals and were worth the investment. That might sound like an endorsement of CTBC, but a careful read of the document paints a more complicated picture. Yes, CTBC works, but should it be the preferred option? Read on to see my enumerated list of takeaways. 

1. Both SEPTA and the NYCTA had their own specific reasons for adopting CTBC and the paper does not bother to evaluate those reasons. From the point of evaluating the paper's endorsement of CTBC, the paper does not do much to actually compare it with the alternatives, especially from a cost basis. It basically says, NYCTA wanted to do X, CTBC allows for X, NYCTA is now able to do X, CBTC works.
   
   
2.  The paper reveals why the NYCTA and SEPTA chose CTBC systems and the answer might surprise you! SEPTA wanted a trolley tunnel ATC/ATP system and got one free as compensation from AdTranz for late M-4 cars. The NYCTA needs to be able to run both equipped and unequipped trains in mixed service. I suspected that the issue was the NYC Subways extensive use of single rail track circuiting and I was mostly correct in this regard as trying to install a jointless audio frequency track coded circuit system on top of a single rail track circuit system would require some costly hardware "hacks" as opposed to less costly software hacks.
   
   
3.  Cybersecurity is a ticking time bomb for CBTC systems. For both SEPTA and NYCTA "A complete description of the necessary security measures for the product over its life-cycle was not included in the System Safety Certification Plan." Even if best practices were followed when the systems were installed in 2003-2006, they have almost certainly aged out (think SHA-1 or RSA 1024). Both systems communicate on the 2.4Ghz WiFi band using a deterministic spread spectrum technique to avoid interfering with WiFi. Wireless message integrity on SEPTA's system is provided by CRC checks (not secure) and "authenticity" is provided by header formatting and train ID (also not secure). It is highly likely that tools could be created that could interfere with operations, although human operators would mitigate potential impacts.
   
   
4. The paper confirms that the the pre-2003 L line capacity was 20tph under DT-ABS/ATS and was raised to 24tph under CBTC with a possible increase to 26tph with traction power upgrades.
   
   
5. The L line re-signaling was contracted for $217 million and SEPTA's trolley CBTC was valued at $24 million. No effort was made to track down cost overruns, the cost of alternative signaling or the cost of debugging the CTBC.
   
   
6.  Both systems were indicated to have experienced 1-2 years of service impacts due to debugging issues. SEPTA's were noted as "significant". As of 2013 SEPTA's CBTC outages were pretty rare, however a trolley needing to cut out CBTC and operate manually via traditional ABS happened about 5-6 times per week. It was mentioned that SEPTA desired additional degraded service modes for the future Rt 101/102 install as "cut out" and "crawl" were insufficient.
   
   
7.  SEPTA's system was intended as a safety upgrade only. It did not increase or decrease capacity, nor did it save money due to the retention of the fixed ABS as backup. The capacity standard was 60tph.
   
   
8. The number of maintainable items is as high as ABS systems. Long term maintenance was not addressed, nor long term availability of proprietary parts. Note, parts for cab signal systems are still available from multiple vendors. If the original vendor cuts off support it may force another round of re-signaling, raising CBTC lifecycle costs.
   

I had been generally aware of all these issues before I found this paper, but they had all come from first hand experience and unofficial sources on various forums. I encourage you all to read the paper and leave your takeaways in the comments.

NYCTA KINGS HIGHWAY Tower Closes

 While I was hoping that the massive COVID related hit to transit would freeze infrastructure "improvements", many transit agencies seem to have kept the faith in Federal funding and use the reduced service plans to accelerate certain infrastructure improvements.  The F route to Church Ave was re-signaled in 2013, closing Model 14 equipped towers at 4TH AVE and CHURCH AVE, which I noted at the time.  This left KINGS HIGHWAY and CULVER YARD as the last remaining towers on the route, with KINGS HIGHWAY having the distinction as being the last elevated main line tower with a traditional interlocking machine, a 44 lever GRS Model 5 (Note the Flushing Line's 111TH ST master tower is also located in a traditional elevated structure). 

Unfortunately due to COVID and obliviousness, I did not get a chance to get out to KINGS HWY before it closed, however well known NYCTA videographer DJ Hammers did a special video on the tower and the re-signaling project, including some interior photos. 

For the lay person, unless the tower is demolished it will look pretty much the same along with the interlocking hardware.  This is in contrast to the underground towers which are frequently cleaned out and plated over. I'm looking for stuff to do this year and getting out to Kings Highway on the F has moved up on the list.

Better Know a Signaling System: Staten Island Railway

Now I know what most people are thinking, the Staten Island Railway uses B&O Color Position Light signals and I already covered B&O Signaling years ago.  Well you would be correct on both accounts, however after a recent trip to document the SIR after it's 2004 re-signaling project I decided that the 14-mile long quasi railroad deserved its own special section.  For those of you who don't know, the SIR, sometimes referred to as Staten Island Rapid Transit, was an orphan B&O property that came about due to 19th century efforts to bust one of Cornelius Venderbilt's ferry monopolies.  Electrified for third rail operation in 1925, the B&O made use of the line to test out the new color position light signaling system that the B&O would eventually adopt system wide.  Signaling on the line consisted of ABS operation between the terminal at St George and the other terminal at  Tottenville with interlockings at each end.  A new tower and a GSR NX style interlocking plant was constructed at St George in 1951 while the Tottenville interlocking was presumably under local control until 1990, although I am not sure where the control station would be.

SIR Tower B

Until the re-signaling in 2004, if you were expecting to find main line style B&O CPL masts, one would be disappointed as at some point, probably after the MTA took control in 1971, the high railroad style masts were replaced with CPL dwarf signals on 7 or so foot tall sticks.

The only mast signal was located on track 1 approaching the St George terminal and it was only capable of displaying slow speed indications due to the lack of any orbitals.

While the 2004 re-signaling project fortunately kept the CPL signaling, any though that CTC operation with multiple new crossover interlockings would bring about orbital equipped double sided CPL masts on both tracks was dashed by the incorporation of a new PRR-style pulse code cab signaling system without intermediate wayside signals.  Although the plethora of new interlockings likely increased the total number of CPL signals in service on the SIR, the use of cab signals with ATC allowed the SIR to present a reduced menu of B&O CPL signaling.

Although some high mast and gantry mounted signals were added, orbitals were limited to the 12 and 6 o'clock positions, as cab signals were expected to take up the task of controlling speed approaching the next fixed signal, even in the case where signals were ostensibly back to back.

This limits signal indications to Clear, Approach, Medium Clear, Medium Approach, Slow Clear, Slow Approach, Restricting and Stop.  Limited speed indications are not used and I am unsure as to the use of Stop and Proceed as any wayside signal that can display Stop and Proceed can also display Restricting.



One interesting addition to the B&O CPL rule set is a Flashing yellow / with 12 o'clock marker for what I have been informed is "Approach Proceed Cab", which would replace Approach Medium and Approach Slow and thus saving on the need for extra orbital modules.  I suspect this indication would only be displayed at back-to-back wayside signal locations and could possibly also serve as an Advance Approach as well, which it might be doing in the above situation where a BL20 MoW diesel was making a relay move. Note that while the CPL dwarfs are authentic GRS equipment, the high CPL equipment is long out of production and the SIR opted to use Safetran PL targets with CL-20 modules as the markers.

That about sums it up.  One could simply say that the SIR uses B&O CPLs, minus indications for Approach Medium, Medium Approach Medium, Approach Slow, Medium Approach Slow, but with the addition of Approach Proceed Cab.  However, I am happy to report that after some painstaking research I was able to confirm that there exists at least one 10 o'clock orbital in service on the SIR and it is located at the Tottenville Interlocking 6W signal (west end of the track 2 station platform).

Click to expand!

Used to give train operators on track 2 visual indication of a lined crossover route to head west, the approach medium capable signal was present when it visited in 2003 and remains there to this day as the Tottenville terminal interlocking was not substantially altered by the 2004 resignaling project.  Therefore, despite the slow service and the abysmal headways, I recommend riding all the way to the end of the line where you will be rewarded with what is arguably the most "B&O" CPL on the SIR.  



BTW, the above video proved to be a great resource for the SIR's Tottenville terminal operation.  Skip ahead to 8:30 to see the Approach Medium and 7:30 for an eastbound train approaching Tottenville under a Medium Approach.

High Impedance

An often overlooked issue with railroad (or transit) electrification is the conflicting requirement to use the rails for traction return current and to divide the truck up into electrically isolated segments for the purposes of track circuit signaling. Installing insulated joints between substations would either cause the electric vehicle to not go or would force the return current to find other transmission paths, most of which are usually not intended to see electrical current flow and might not be too happy about it either.

The right hand rail is insulated at the track circuit block boundary, the left is not.

Your first option is to use the one rail or 1+1 system.  Here you have one rail with insulated joints creating track circuit blocks and the other rail acting as a common ground without insulated joints.  One downside is that only the insulated rail gets broken rail protection.  There are probably other downsides as well as this method was only used on some of the oldest electrified transit systems such as the NYC Subway.  Another option is to have a 4th rail system like the London Underground where traction return current uses a dedicated 4th rail instead of the running rails.  The better option is to use a device called an impedance bond to have both isolated track circuit blocks and a traction return path via the rails.

Here we see a Union Switch and Signal model impedance bond, patented in 1922.  I am not sure if there were any earlier models of bond or if this was used on the 1915-1918 PRR and New Haven 25hz electrification projects before the patent was granted, but it would have been available for the major waves of electrification that took place in the 1920's and 30's.  An impedance bond is a type of isolation transformer where traction return current can pass with low impedance (impedance is the AC version of resistance), while track circuit current faces high impedance and thus follows the path of least resistance through the track circuit logic. The necessary trick to making this work is to have track circuit current at a different frequency than the traction return current.  For example DC traction current with an AC track circuit or one frequency of AC return current with another frequency of AC track circuit. 

In the above diagram from a Japanese Wikipedia page we can see a slightly more elaborate setup for an impedance bond.  The two coils connected at the center tap are what constitute the impedance bond.  The secondary windings capture the AC track circuit current via the magic of induction and feed the signal logic.  More typically the bond omits this secondary winding and the signal logic is fed directly from the rails.  Remember this is a super high level summary so for more detailed technical information please consult Google or your reference library.

Here we see two of the 1922 patent US&S bonds and their modern Siemens replacements for use on Amtrak's NEC.  Amtrak, like the PRR before it, uses 25hz traction power and 91.66hz coded AC track circuits.  Normally the coded track circuits would operate at 100hz, but as a multiple of 25, return current harmonics could be detected as track circuit current, which is bad.  91.66hz is close enough to 100hz to be cross compatible with 100hz electronics.

The spec plate on the new bonds show the Amp rating for traction return current and the impedance values for 100hz current (400 ohms) and 60hz current (2.4 ohms).  While 25hz isn't listed I am assuming that the value would be in an acceptable range. A DC traction system sees much higher amp loads than an AC system and therefore the bonds must be much larger with thicker windings to handle it.  Systems with both AC and DC, like Penn Station, would use DC rated bonds.



 Of course the story doesn't stop there.  In the late 1960's the rail signaling industry introduced the concept of jointless track circuits for use in transit applications.  These make use of AC frequencies in the "audio" range of 1-5 kHz.  These higher frequencies attenuate after a much shorter distance and using a mix of frequencies one can have a given track circuit receiver able to hear the signal from a single specific transmitter.  Still there is the issue of the pesky traction return current that needs to move between the rails, to ground and NOT into the signaling logic.  The solution was the Wee-Zee bond (trademark of GRS) that creates this path to ground while preventing the track circuit signal passing between the two rails.

In this close up of a US&S "Minibond" on the Chicago El, we can see the the listed transmit-receive frequency pairs, the cab signal code frequency and the DC power rating (3000amps at 0.00003 ohm).

Now if you like Technology Connections, here's an interesting one for you that revolves around the necessity of impedance bonds.  Europe is currently under the thrall of axle counters for train detection as opposed to track circuits.  Why would the normally safety conscious Europe in interested in a train detection system that doesn't positively detect the presence of a train (or flood or broken rail)?  Because the Central European 16.66Hz electrification club, which includes Germany, Austria, Switzerland and a few others, electrified their rail systems were those systems were still operated using non-track circuited manual block signaling.  When upgrading to automatic block signaling, installing track circuits would require installation of impedance bonds and related electronics.  Therefore an alternative, axle counters, was sought out and adopted.

Likewise, the NYC Subway is moving to Communications Based Train Control instead of the audio frequency track circuits as their use of the one rail system would require the installation of who knows how many Wee-Zee bonds.  Just goes to show how technical decisions can be highly path dependent.  Keep that in mind the next time you have trouble figuring our the logic behind that might not make complete sense. 

NYC Subway Signaling - A Decade of Change

Ten years ago I was provided with a amazing PDF document from the New York City Transit Authority that contained diagrams of every rail line, every rail yard and every interlocking on the Subway, Staten Island Railroad and even some railroad shotlines. The interlocking diagrams themselves had details from switch and signal numbers, details regarding the control panels and interlocking machines and even the date of details of the contracts that the signaling equipment was installed under.

Since then the NYCTA has been pushing hard to eliminate the last bastions of single interlocking towers with CTBC projects ongoing on the Flushing and Queens Boulevard Lines.  As my document aged I attempted to get an updated copy, but was told that the NYCTA was annoyed that the first consolidated document had ever been created and that the information had been effectivly split up between all the various line managers.  I don't know if that was true or not, the NYCTA culture thrives on control of information (often using "terrorism" as a justification), but while searching for some photos of the old E 180th St tower to fix a dead link I came upon a 2019 version of the same document.

Because nobody had metaphorically slipped me the new version "under the table" with a promise of confidentiality, I am just going to link both documents here so you all can see for yourself the extent of signaling heritage that has been lost on the NYCTA over the last ten years.  Enjoy.

NYCTA Schematic Track and Interlocking Diagrams 2009
NYCTA Schematic Track and Interlocking Diagrams 2019

The Alstom GM4000 - It's a Fake!

Excuse the click-bait-y title, but I just discovered something the other day that I wanted to bring to everybody's attention.  In North America there are effectivly two families of electric point machines,  The Union Switch and Signal M3 family and the General Railway Signal Model 5 Family.  You can order these in a variety of variants, single control, dual control, low profile, high profile, etc.  These two families have been around for so long that in the case of the M3 a variety of third parties are offering legit off-brand examples at a lower price point and without the US&S trademark.   Back in the 60's, GRS decided to get ahead of the copycats by designing a brand new point machine with a new set of associated patents and trade secrets.  Known as the Model 55, this cheap looking rectangle was relegated to North American transit systems, although it did kind of become the closest thing to a standard point machine that the UK has (so like I said, transit systems).

GRS Model 55 on the TTC's Scarborough Rapid Transit.

Needless to say the Model 55 was never very popular and even some of its enthusiastic early adopters, namely the Washington Area Metro and South Jersey's Port Authority Rapid Transit, eventually ultimately their Model 55's for US&S M3's.  I don't know why this was the case, but I suspect a lack of support was part of the reason as GRS had a new European parent in the form of Alstom and daddy Alstom was intent on making its own new M3 "killer" along with the associated patents.

Low profile US&S M3 on the NYCTA (7) Line at Queensboro Plaza

Backtracking a few decades, to take on the GRS Model 4 and GRS Model 55's electric transit switch machines, US&S had developed a low profile version of is venerable M3 because third rail shoes are a thing on transit. Basically it looks just like a regular M3 only flattened down by an inch or two.  So when the following appeared at Amtrak's rebuilt CORK interlocking in 2005, I thought they had opted for some sort of off brand low profile M3.

However something always bugged me about that shape and style and my instinct was indeed correct as that is not a low profile M3, but an Alstom GM4000A switch machine.  The spiritual successor to the GRS Model 55 and, apparently to some comments I got, just as failure prone.  Nevertheless a bunch of railroads bought GM4000s about 15 years ago and I happened to run into some of the survivors for the first time last December at Conrail's CP-JOHN in Morrisville, PA.

Outwardly presenting as a US&S low profile M3, the GM4000A is given away by having just two segments on top instead of three,  However if you check out the manual for the original model GM4000, it does indeed have the three segments.

I'm not here to speculate about why this inferior modern replacement of tried and true 1930's technology is an inferior modern replacement of tried and true 1930's technology.  That's a question for a C&S purchasing officer.  What I want people to take away is the knowledge that GM4000 family point machines are a thing, how at first glance they may resemble low profile M3's and that they might soon vanish from the scene so go take some photos while you can.  In this day and age every bit of diversity is a plus. 

NYCTA Northern Blvd Tower Closed

I have some to realize that every time I see something that appears to be escaping the threat of upgrade, it is actually on tap for complete removal.  This was the case with CP-TITUS and more recently it was the case with Northern Boulevard interlocking on the IND Queens Boulevard Line.

Northern Boulevard is on the local loop of the Queens Boulevard line that takes a longer path than the center express tracks.  It was one of the smallest tower controlled interlockings left on the NYCTA with a single crossover and 5 signals controlled from a 7 lever GRS Model 5 interlocking machine from 1933.  Some say it was intended as a short turn terminal for one of the old IND local services.

When I last visited this site a year or so ago I did not see any of the replacement signals I had spotted at larger interlockings like Union Turnpike and Continental Ave.  At first I thought the local loop was going to escape the CBTC re-signaling project, but I just caught word that the simple interlocking had been completely ripped out.

Noted NYCTA Videographer DJ Hammers actually compiled a short video detailing the changes that took place over a week or so.



With the 6th Ave line following the Queens Boulevard Line in being re-signaled, the NYC Subway is getting alarmingly short of electro-mechanical interlocking machines, so get out and try to catch them while you can.

NYCTA Speed Increases - Q1 2019 Update

Back in December I reported on how the NYC Subway was finally being forced to move away from their "safety at all costs" mentality because they had pretty much melted the whole system down.  Well I am happy to report that the effort has continued on at pretty much the same pace into 2019 with about another 27 speed improvements taking effect since January 21th, 2019. 

And these aren't all just trivial increases of 5 mph.  If you look at the above chart you'll see an instance of a 25mph restriction being removed entirely (basically raising the speed to whatever the motorman can get) and if you like something a little bit more definite you can see another instance of a 25mph restriction being raised to 45mph.  You can see the MTA's official list of speed improvements right here and also catch some legitimate reporting on the project at Railway Age.

PATCO just recently had their 40mph tunnel stretches knocked back to 30mph because it made the consultants nervous despite there being not a single issue over 50 years over operation. 

Hopefully this will inspire other transit systems that have seen similar slowdowns, like PATCO and SEPTA, to disregard Cover Their Ass consultants and get back their lost capacity. You never know when you might need it.

W 4th St Tower - Closed But Not Yet Forgotten

I previously reported that the NYC Transit Authority was closing most of the classic towers on the 6th Avenue trunk line in Manhattan.  Chief among these  these were 34th St tower and West 4th St tower.  The latter was notable for its "fishbowl" status with little in the way to prevent the average rider from observing how the GRS Model 5 machine functioned. Previously, when the NYCTA resignaled lines the former "tower"rooms were quickly stripped of the old signaling equipment and then often re-purposed into some other space, usually with the windows being walled or otherwise covered over.  For example the Queens Boulevard towers  were completely devoid of any heritage equipment mere weeks after their closure.

Therefore you can imagine my surprise when I found the legacy W 4th St tower to have been pretty much untouched, months after it had been closed back in August/September 2018.

Although devoid of personnel, the interlocking machine was still in place with all of the levers tagged out of service.  The desks and other tower accoutrements were also still present. 

I am not sure if there are some sort of plans to preserve the tower, potentially maxing it a Transit Museum annex, but I wouldn't count such a thing out given the strong support for the historic subway trips and the need for the NYC Subway to put on a better face for the public after completely melting down.  It could also be due to the fact that resources have been all diverted to more pressing needs. 

In any event, go get some photos while you still can and before this piece of history vanishes from view.

Speeds Finally Increasing on the NYC Subway

We might have a first here as the increasingly dismal performance of a transit system has managed to override the calls of the safety scolds and the NYC Subway is reversing decades of policy by dramatically increasing speeds system-wide.  Basically someone noticed that when trains run slower, capacity and delay recovery get worse and after trying to shrug things off and claim the cause was a lack of funding, Also we need to credit the role of the media in calling the TA out on it's decades long policy of slowing the system down.

Before you assume that this is only saving time around the margins, just look at the savings in the above chart and remember that this is only the start of the improvements and also doesn't count all of the faulty time signals that are being repaired.  At speeds under 40 or 50 mph, small improvements from 15 to 25mph represent a significant percentage increase in the overall speed.  Going from 10 to 20mph decreases travel time BY HALF, even though the increase is only 10mph.

Let's just go over again why the TA is in this situation.  First, at some point emergency braking rates were reduced to prevent passenger injury on board trains and after some accidents in the 90's, speeds were generally slowed to prevent accidents.  That's legitimate (although the passenger injury thing is less so), however we don't know how this was carried out, especially if it was done without analysis or under existing infrastructure constraints.  Since the 90's slow downs, more speed control mechanisms have been installed.  In some cases it was strictly to reduce wear and tear on curves or prevent other maintenance issues.  In others it was a ploy to decrease reliance on employee skill to maintain a schedule and prevent rulebook slowdowns.

Ultimately the biggest problem is the propensity of rail transit speed restrictions to be sticky. It is always more of a problem to try and change something that has been there for decades, than it is to just leave it alone.  Also, raising speeds requires careful analysis, lowering them generally doesn't.  A speed limit set in 1930 reflected the equipment of the day and was likely very conservative as analysis tools were limited.  Over time employees would learn what the safe speeds actually were,but when decision were made to enforce the limits, the 1930's figures were taken as gospel resulting in unnecessary slowdown.  Currently PTC is bringing the same problem to the national rail system.  I wonder how many decades it will be there is sufficient outcry to reevaluate all of the outdated assumptions that will gum up the works.

Closed and Closing NYCTA 6th Ave Line Towers

Another two major losses in the world of North American power interlocking machines as the 1940 vintage towers 34TH ST and W 4TH ST, both on the NYC Subway 6th Avenue Line, will both be closed by the end of this week.  Actually, 34TH ST tower already closed back in May, while W 4TH ST tower will be closed over the two week period centered on the weekend past.  Both towers were equipped with GRS Model 5 pistol grip type machines and W 4TH is perhaps the most famous of them all for its "fishbowl" windows looking out onto the lower downtown platform for all the world to see.

While W 4TH ST and it's 54 lever frame controlled an impressive plant, linking the 8th and 6th Ave lines south  of Midtown, it unfortunately did not put on much of a show unless trains were being diverted.  The operators could sit back with the entire plant straight railed and signals fleeted, pausing only to harass those interested enough to even peer through the window.




34TH ST tower on the other hand had a 68 lever frame controlling perhaps the closest thing the NYCTA had to a complete railroad 4 track crossover, although it was embellished with a few unnecessary scissors crossovers.  This tower was located a bit down front the end of the uptown platform, but due to the 34th St Station platforms being offset, it could be viewed from the side.

As we speak W 4TH is being slowly cut over, one track at a time with the process scheduled to be completed on the weekend of August 12th, 2018.  Anyone in the NYC area should make a special trip to get some video and piss the unionized tower operators off one last time ;-)

Don't believe the hype.  These old school machines will have lasted decades longer than what replaces them They are reliable and hack-proof as long as they see proper maintenance.  Unfortunately that is something the NYCTA can't afford so they beg for capitol money for a flaky CTBC solution that costs billions and only increases capacity by 5-10%.  So long, and farewell old friends.

New York Media Picks Up On True Cause of Subway Meltdown

I wanted to give a shout out to someone at the New York Times for reporting on the real cost of "safety" improvements.  For those of you who aren't aware, the NYC Subway is currently experiencing a meltdown due to high ridership and delays that quickly propagate through an at-capacity system.  The NYCTA/MTA are quick to blame the high ridershi or generic "aging infrastructure", however a Times reporter correctly put the blame squarely on two decisions the MTA made under the guise of improving safety.

One of these was a decision to drastically expand the number of speed control signals throughout the system.  Once only used in the locations most at risk of a speed related derailment, they have been placed all over the system in an effort to remove operator skill from the equation of train operation.  What the MTA didn't forsee (and what anyone familiar with this topic easily could) was that the speed control signals induced operators to reducing speed far below what should have been allowed.  This is because operators are not only punished for getting tripped by the Automatic Train Stop, but also because the speed control signals are not well maintained or calibrated and will often release 5-10 mph below the speeds they should.  This results in highly conservative train operation.  The net result was that all of the slack time in the system was used up dealing with speed control signals so now even the smallest delay will persist for hours, affecting both the initially delayed train and every train behind it.

4 one shot timer signals at Canal St replacing what had once been left to the operator's skill.

We can see PTC having the same effect with SEPTA, Amtrak and Metro North all having to increase their running times to account for the slower speeds.  Speed control thresholds don't take existing safety margins into account and calculated braking curves are also highly conservative making all trains run like they have a grandmother at the controls. All of this will reduce capacity and make making up time a concept of the past.

Some insiders have stated that the true reason behind the slow down of trains using speed control signals is to gain leverage over the unionized workforce in contract negotiations.  Not only does removing skill from the position allow for the recruitment of younger or less skilled workers, it also prevents rulebook slowdowns, the Transit Worker's union only weapon since strikes are banned by state law.  The idea was to slow the system down proactively so that work actions would lose their power (think of the frog in the boiling pot of water). However now the scuttlebutt is that management simply doesn't know what it's doing and there is no real strategy behind the slowdowns aside from doing what the safety consultants recommend. 

An interesting point of comparison is The PATH railroad that runs between New York and Newark.  It uses pretty much the same equipment and signaling system, but the timers are timed properly so that the operators can run right at them at the prescribed speed and not get tripped. In fact, before 2010 the PATH equipment didn't even come with speedometers, requiring the engineers to know how fast they were going on instinct.



Anyway it will be interesting to see if the MTA is forced to back down from its position of slowing down the system in the name of "safety" or if they will stay the course and try to extract billions from the government for such Wunderwaffen as CBTC. Which, I should mention, is only expected to deliver an additional 2 tph on the 7 line, resulting in a frequency that is still below historic levels when operators were given the freedom to use their skills to maintain the schedule.. 

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/09/nyregion/subway-crisis-mta-decisions-signals-rules.html

NYCTA Union Turnpike Tower Closes and Warwick CPL's Fall

Double shot of bad news today, although none of it was unexpected.  At 5am on Monday, February 20th, 2018, the UNION TURNPIKE tower on the NYCTA Queens Boulevard Line closed.  The tower had entered service on 12/1/1936 and contained a 43-lever US&S Model 14 machine.  It was replaced by the new Forest Hills Master Tower that also closed  Roosevelt Avenue Tower (60-lever GRS Model 5) on 7/11/2016 and Continental Avenue Tower (83-lever US&S Model 14) on 9/11/2017.  As I reported earlier in the year, the Northern Boulevard tower (12-lever GRS Model 5), remains open on the local alignment, but will also be closed at some point.  The Model 14 towers at Parsons and Jamaica Yard are not currently scheduled for replacement.

In other news, the replacement signals covering the CTC island at Warwick, OH (south of Akron) have been cut over.  These have some significance for me as I recall that back around 2000 I was taking my first real long distance Amtrak journey via the old Three Rivers.  After being delayed by over 4 hours between Pittsburgh and Akron due to freight congestion, I awoke in my coach seat to see all sorts of strange sites out the window.  At Warwick, the RoW opened up with yard tracks in the middle.  Emerging from the morning fog I saw B&O CPL signals in their native habitat.  It wasn't the first ones I had seen in person of course, but just seeing them when so much of the trip was to be filled with darth vaders on the rebuilt Chicago main line was an amazing experience.

So long and farewell old friends.

Queens Boulevard Towers, Still Hanging On

Just a quick status update from the Queens Boulevard Line in NYC.  As I previously reported, the NYCTA was closing towers along the line as part of a general move away from manual interlocking operation on the IND division.  At that time Roosevelt Ave tower has closed with Continental Ave and Union Turnpike close behind. 

Gone without a trace

 Well as of Veterans Day there has been some good news and bad news.  The bad news is that not only have Roosevelt and Continental both closed, but both classic interlocking machines, a GRS Model 5 and US&S Model 14, have both been removed and the spaced converted into employee hangouts.  The good news is that Union Turnpike is still in operation along with the small tower at Northern Boulevard on the local branch of the line.  That small tower operates a single trailing point crossover with a 12-lever GRS Model 5 machine.

In related news, color light dwarf signals continued to appear in the JAY interlocking complex on the LIRR, one even being at the end of a platform.  As mentioned previously they are bare stacks of Safetran clam shells instead of something sensible like an LED searchlight.

DUNTON interlocking is so far unaffected and both VAN and BROOK interlockings are also not exhibiting any changes.   The temporary pedestal automatic signals are still in place at Woodside and I recommend anyone in the area try to get out and photograph them before the new color light signal bridge is activated for the East Side Access project.  One upcoming opportunity will be for this year's Holiday Nostalgia Train, which will be providing runs between 2nd Ave and 95th St on the Second Avenue Subway instead of to Queens Plaza.  I highly recommend it!